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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court pursuant to § 78-
2a-3(2)(d) Utah Code Ann. (1992 Supp.) whereby the Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction over all appeals from the Circuit Court. 
"Section 78-2a-3(2)(d) gives the court of appeals jurisdiction 
over 'appeals from the circuit courts,'" State v. Humphrey, 823 
P.2d 464, 467 (Utah 1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Under rules of statutory construction, can "throwing" be 
fairly interpreted to include the conduct of spitting? 
2. Is Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.6 vague as applied to a 
defendant prisoner who spits on a correctional officer? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Questions of statutory interpretation and vagueness are 
questions of law. Forbes v. St. Mark's Hospital, 754 P.2d 933, 
934 (Utah 1988) . The court should apply a correctness standard, 
"giving no deference [to the trial court's] conclusions of law." 
Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 818 (Utah 
1991). Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
1. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Amendment XIV. "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . " 
2. UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article I, § 7. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." 
3. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
a. § 76-5-102.6 Assault on a correctional officer. Any 
prisoner who throws fecal material or any other substance or 
object at a peace or correctional officer is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant was charged with Assault on a Correctional 
Officer, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.6 on May 29, 1992. (R. at 1.) 
On June 19, 1992 the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which 
was heard on July 9, 1992. (R. at 14.) Judge Fuchs granted the 
motion to dismiss on the grounds that the statute did not apply. 
(R. at 75.) 
FACTS 
The parties stipulated that John B. Byrge, a correctional 
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officer at the Salt Lake County Jail, if called as a witness 
would testify that on May 23, 1992 Byrge was on duty, that 
defendant was a prisoner confined in the Salt Lake County Jail, 
and that defendant intentionally spit a mouthful of mucus at and 
onto Byrge. (R. at 74-75.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Under general rules of statutory construction the statute 
should be interpreted according to its usual and accepted 
meaning. In applying this principle, courts should not be 
restrained by lock step literalness but let reason prevail. The 
legislature intended to protect correctional officers from 
attempts by prisoners to douse officers with foul substances. To 
limit the application of § 76-5-102.6 by interpreting the word 
"throw" as "to propel with the arm" is unjustified. There are 
other accepted meanings for the term which give effect to the 
legislative intent. Confining the definition to "propel with the 
arm" though a usual and accepted meaning allows the statute to 
delineate prohibited activity by criteria that is unrelated to 
the harm the legislature sought to prevent. Therefore, the court 
should define the word "throw" to include "to propel through the 
air in any manner" and also to define the act of spitting to be 
included in the definition of "throw." 
The statute is not vague for three reasons. First, the 
statute establishes a standard to prevent arbitrary application 
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by the corrections officers. Second, the defendant should have 
been reasonably aware this conduct was prohibited. Third, 
Propelling mucus through the air at a corrections officer is not 
outside the objectives contemplated by the statute. Therefore, 
the statute is not vague or ambiguous and does not deny the 
defendant the protection of due process. 
ARGUMENT 
Under Fundamental Rules Of Statutory Construction § 76-5-
102.6 Prohibits A Prisoner From Spitting On A Corrections 
Officer. 
The general rules of statutory construction require that the 
terms of a statute be interpreted "in accord with their usual and 
accepted meanings." Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 
1037, 1045 (Utah 1991). Also, the statute should not be 
construed in a piecemeal fashion but rather as a whole and in 
light of its purpose or in other words the legislature's intent 
in enacting the statute. Id.; Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 
115 (Utah 1991); Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah 
1983). The legislature has codified these rules for use in 
interpreting criminal statutes. 
The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed 
shall not apply to this code, any of its provisions, or any 
offense defined by the laws of this state. All provisions 
of this code and offenses defined by the laws of this state 
shall be construed according to the fair import of their 
terms to promote justice and to effect the objects of the 
law and general purposes of Section 76-1-104. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-106 (1992). In applying these rules, Utah 
courts have read criminal statute according to their plain 
meaning. State v. Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822, 826 (Utah App. 1991). 
Reason and intention sometimes prevail over technically applied 
literalness. State v. Jones. 735 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah App. 1987); 
State v. Serpente, 768 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah App. 1989). In 
addition, courts sometimes refer to the dictionary to understand 
the usual and accepted meanings of words. See State v. One 1979 
Pontiac Trans Am, 771 P.2d 682, 683 (Utah App. 1989); See also 
Serpente. 768 P.2d at 996. 
In 1992, the legislature voted into law House Bill 176 which 
enacted Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.6 (1992). A common sense 
reading of the statute indicates that its purpose is to protect 
the health and safety of guards, jailers and other officers by 
prohibiting attempts by prisoners to douse officers with foul 
substances. Also, the statute applies to "any prisoner." It 
applies to "fecal material or any other substance or object." It 
applies to and protects any "peace or correctional officer." 
Such language seems to be meant to cover a variety of 
circumstances. Indeed, during the floor debate on H.B. 176 the 
Billfs sponsor stated it covered those circumstances when 
prisoners mistreated their guards. See Floor Debate, Utah House 
of Representatives, February 17, 1992 (Rep. Tuttle: "What this 
does is . . . give the . . . prisons . . . a tool that they can 
use . . . on criminals that . . . are not kind to their innkeeper 
. . . " ) . Judge Fuchs even recognized this as the purpose of the 
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statute. See Transcripts of Motion Hearing, p.10. 
Even though he recognized the purpose of the statute, Judge 
Fuchs held that the word "throw" as used in the statute meant 
only "to propel with your arm." Transcript of Motion Hearing, p. 
10. Such a narrow definition of the word "throw" is not 
justified for several reasons; first, there are several other 
usual and accepted meanings of the word "throw," second, some of 
these meanings are more consistent with and give effect to the 
legislative intent, and third, the legislature has used the word 
"throw" in other statutes, without specific statutory definition, 
to mean propel by any means rather than just by motion of the 
arm. 
It is true that a common definition of the word "throw" is 
"to propel through the air by a forward motion of the hand and 
arm." Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 2385 (1981). 
But even this does not fit Judge Fuchs1 definition of "throw" 
since he apparently would allow as a "throw" any movement of the 
arm which propels an object. However, in the second subsection 
of that first definition, Webster's also includes, "to propel 
through the air in any manner" i.e. "heavy rifles . . . able to 
throw a bullet five miles . . . " and "a fire engine throwing a 
stream of water" and a "satellite will be thrown into space." 
Interestingly, the dictionary contains over thirty-four (34) 
definitions of the word "throw." All of these definitions are 
accepted, most are usual. Some of the more common meanings 
include: "to cause to fall off" (the horse threw its rider); "to 
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drive or impel on a violent manner" (the ship was thrown on the 
reef); "to put forcefully or roughly;" "to place or propel as if 
by a throw;" "to deliver (a blow) in or as if boxing;" "to get 
rid of: divest or strip oneself of: cast off;" "to send forth" 
(throw a shadow). Id. 
There is nothing in the plain language of the statute nor in 
the purpose of the statute that indicates that the legislature 
was concerned about the forward motion of prisoners1 arms. 
Certainly to focus on such would make the statute absurd. 
Imagine, to use a baseball pitch like motion to throw fecal 
material on a guard would be illegal but to throw backwards would 
not, to kick fecal material would not, to use a device to throw 
or fling fecal material would not. More importantly, the harm to 
be prevented has little if anything to do with the method with 
which substances are propelled. The health and safety of the 
officers will be compromised just as much whether the foul 
substances are the result of the forward motion of the hand and 
arm or the result of some other method the prisoner used to 
propel the substance. Surely the legislature did not intend to 
give the word "throw" a meaning that delineates whether or not 
activity is criminal, based upon criteria that has little if 
anything to do with the harm sought to be prevented. 
On the other hand the definition of "throw" that means "to 
propel through the air in any manner" is reasonable and does give 
effect to the legislative intent. It is an accepted and usual 
meaning of the word "throw" and allows the statute to delineate 
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whether the activity is criminal or not on criteria directly 
related to the harm sought to be prevented. Furthermore, with 
such a definition, the statute is given full effect under most if 
not all of the circumstances in which prisoners could use flying 
foul substances to be "not kind to their innkeepers." 
In other contexts and without excuse or codified 
definitions, the legislature has used the word "throw" in ways 
unrelated to the forward movement of the hand and arm. Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-150.10 (1992) requires mud guards on motor vehicle's 
wheels that "may throw dirt . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 53A-13-103 
(1992) requires eye protection for students in activities 
involving "the operation of equipment that could throw particles 
. . . ." Also, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-306 (1992) prohibits 
certain devices that are "arranged so as to explode, ignite, or 
throw forth its contents . . . ." 
The usual and accepted meaning of the word "throw" includes 
to propel in any manner. Such a definition also includes the 
action of spitting mucous at and onto correctional officer Byrge. 
After all, spitting is just a method of propelling mucous through 
the air. In this case, defendant spit the mucous from his 
position it traveled through the air and hit the officer. 
Moreover, the very definition of spitting includes "throw." The 
dictionary definitions include, "to eject from the mouth . . . " 
and "to emit or eject as if by spitting: throw forth or out . . . 
." Webster1 New International Dictionary 2199 (1981). 
Given the plain language of the statue and the legislative 
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fiicu .*/ enacted, this Court should apply the 
rules of construction i nterpret the 
statute to give effect: to its design -:-. purpose, that it; l,„u 
del lite I.hi win 1 include "to propel through the air in 
any manner" and also : -;t .. \iui • -*• I - -i-1 • t i n i " - be included 
in the definition of "throv 
Section 76-5-102.6 Does Not Violate Due 
Vagueness. 
Sectic *•-:'" " Assault on a correctional officer, i'... 
r *-><- **'** /iolate due process guaranteed by 
Article nendment of 
the Constitutior '[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine 
requii define the criminal offense w > 
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people i,an under 
ci ; * prohibited and * ianner that does not encourage 
arbitrary and disc. <olender v. Lawson, 
461 ^. 3 . • • ; - : * - . Ed. 2 d 9 0 "9 ( 19 8. :i) 
ii volende Ldwsu - convicted violating Cal. Penal 
Code *-*- - < ^wpst olendei 
1856. The California Court Appeals interpreted an 
eai ] i ei * " person detained by the police ' > 
provide credible
 : . reliable" ider 
355-56, S. * ':i*'''~ : -•*• .-r* ^ : - * >.- > suspect was 
detained the sh standards by which the 
officers may determine whether the suspect has compl. *- e 
subsr jurrif i ilr utif ication requirement. " Id, at 
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1860. Therefore, the Court held, the statute was void-for-
vagueness and encouraged arbitrary enforcement. Id. 
In State v. Archambeau, the defendant parolee was convicted 
of Possession of a Dangerous Weapon By a Restricted Person. 
State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991). The 
court held that the defendant should have been reasonably aware 
that the two 10-inch knives and 48 inch blowgun were "objectively 
dangerous weapons." Id. at 929. Although Archambeau received a 
warning about possessing dangerous weapons, the court did not 
treat this as dispositive. Id. at 929, ("Furthermore, defendant 
was specifically put on notice by his parole officers . . . " ) . 
Thus the statute's use of the terms "dangerous weapons" was not 
vague. Archambeau, at 929. 
In Pratt v. State, the defendant was convicted of 'Keeping a 
Disorderly House,' and subsequently appealed. Pratt v. State, 
642 P.2d 268, 269 (Okl.Cr. 1982). The defendant claimed the 
terms "peace, comfort or decency," in the statute were subject to 
multiple definitions and rendered the statute unconstitutionally 
vague. Id. The court held that the terms were not vague because 
all that was required was a reasonable certainty that the conduct 
was prohibited by the general term without the aid of definition. 
Id. at 270. It does not even violate due process "though the 
definition of the term contains an element of degree whereby 
reasonable men may differ." Id. The neighbors of the defendant 
in Pratt testified they were subjected to "loud and raucous 
music, public drunkenness, urination in public, fist fights, 
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shotitiing of obscenities and automobile racing,fl Id. The court 
held these act. objectives 
contemplated by the statute, and a person of reasona 
^xd k n o w j_n acjvance the conduct was prohibited. 
Id. 
in the instant case, the statute prohibits a prisoner fiuim 
propel J, illi1"1 .i 1 r f civil material other substance 
object r correctional officer .\olender, f/lk, 
itute establishes standard by which ; officer may determine 
*-^e prisone . in. |.i.iliil>i ; uonduct. When a 
prisoner propels through the air any substance «r a\ ;*- t .ml a 
officer, the prisoner has violated r s terms. Like 
Archambeau, Paul, a prisoner, i \,j a c\ • >na h 1 y aware 
that the spitting of mucus into the hair of his keeper, Is 
proli i b i! ad «• i ii" i i I'p Pi alt. , propelling - .•: J* through the 
air at a corrections officer not outside -s 
contemplated by 1 statute. Therefore .^ -~t 
vague or ambiguous defendant the protection 
of due process. 
CONCLUSION 
Under general i IJ1<>S -I ,t ,il nl ,«i y , , n«,1 in ! i n, f In language 
in the Assault On A Corrections Officer statute should be 
jnt ei | "i et.e'i in
 (i<ti»iii ii ii« «i J su<* J. and accepted meaning. The 
term "throw" should not be limited to "propel 
several reasons. First, such a narrow interpretation does not 
give effect to the legislature's intent. Second, there are 
numerous other usual and accepted meanings in the dictionary that 
do give effect to the intent of the legislature. Third, the 
legislature has used these usual and accepted definitions in other 
statutes. Therefore, the court should apply the rules of 
construction to reasonably and fairly interpret the statute to give 
effect to its design and purpose, that is to define the word 
"throw" to include "to propel through the air in any manner" and 
also to define the act of spitting to be included in the definition 
of "throw." 
The Assault on A Corrections Officer statute is not 
vague. The statute establishes a standard by which the corrections 
offers can measure a violation. A prisoner should be reasonably 
aware that spitting on a corrections officer is prohibited 
conduct. Finally, projecting mucus into the hair of a corrections 
officer is not outside the objectives contemplated by the statute. 
Therefore, the statute does not violate the due process clause of 
either the Utah or the United States Constitution. 
DATED this ^Xx day of November, 1992. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-102.6 which reads in 
its entirety "Any prisoner who throws fecal material or any other 
substance or object at a peace of correctional officer is guilty of 
a Class A Misdemeanor," is not unconstitutionally vague because it 
is sufficiently definite to enable ordinary people to understand 
what conduct is prohibited and is otherwise written in such a 
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement. 
2. The rules of statutory construction do not require 
Section 7 6-5-102.6 to be limited to only fecal material but the 
prohibition on material thrown includes any other substance or 
object. 
3. The word "throw" and used in Section 76-5-102.6 means 
to propel through the air by the foward motion of the arm. The 
word "throw" does not include to spit or spitting. 
DATED this /6 day of August, 1992. 
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Judge of The Third Circuit Court 
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